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Abstract 
 
 Contemporary military campaigns increasingly count on the use of air power. 
Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations have been a crucial element of 
military air power for 50 years. Several developments and evolution in both air defense 
and attack systems suggest that SEAD missions will continue to have growing 
importance to air forces. Since SEAD operations have a significant impact on air 
campaigns, it is important to examine their efficiency and identify improvement 
opportunities. This study explores factors that influence SEAD operations through use of a 
discrete event simulation built in Arena and subsequent statistical analysis of the results.   
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 DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION OF A SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR 
DEFENSES (SEAD) MISSION 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1  Background 
Since the first use of aircraft in combat, the ways to defend forces on the ground 
has been a great challenge to the armed forces. There are reports of balloon and anti-
balloon artillery in the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, and in 1890 the 
Russians tested a field-gun battery against a balloon moored three kilometers away. The 
first airplane downed in combat fell to ground fire in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912; so 
when World War I began, there were precedents for ground-based air defense (Werrell, 
1988: 1). 
Small arms and artilleries were used to hit the aircraft during World War I. On the 
other side to make air defenses inoperative, aircraft could have made only strafing and 
bombing operations. Since that time, the activities of neutralizing, destroying, or 
temporarily degrading enemy air defenses has been known as suppression of enemy air 
defenses (SEAD) which led to the design and construction of aircraft systems and 
weapons for that purpose. Over the years, both attacking aircraft and air defense systems 
have evolved. German forces densely used anti-aircraft artilleries (AAA) during WWII. 
The Allies tried several ways to neutralize the German AAA, but the most effective 
solution was avoidance. With the advent of radio detecting and ranging (radar) 
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equipment, ground-based air defenses became more effective and more lethal. Towards 
the end of WWII, Germany attempted to develop a surface-to-air missile (SAM), but the 
technology necessary to provide guidance for a SAM was not mature enough (Neufeld, 
1995: 152). Therefore, AAA continued to be the primary threat and avoiding AAA 
continued to be the primary tactic throughout the Korean War. Especially in the Vietnam 
War, the Soviet-built radar guided SA-2 SAM added a significant lethal dimension to air 
defense. Total combat losses due to ground-based air defense systems and the growing 
rate of attrition provided clear evidence that SEAD missions were highly important for 
maintaining aircraft survivability and led to an increase in the number of planned SEAD 
sorties. This resulted in the development of new SEAD missions and tactics against the 
evolving threat. Crucial steps in the evolution of the SEAD mission to actively jam 
enemy air defense systems included introduction of the EB-66 electronic warfare (EW) 
aircraft and employment of the first Wild Weasel SEAD aircraft, the F-100F carrying the 
AGM-45A Shrike anti-radiation missile (ARM). 
Afterwards SEAD missions took an important role in Arab-Israeli Wars. In 
contrast to Vietnam’s single threat, Israelis fought against an air defense umbrella 
consisting of a variety of systems, many with the ability to minimize the effects of 
electronic counter measures (ECM) such as jamming. In 1982, two important steps in the 
evolution of air defense and SEAD mission were demonstrated during the Bekaa Valley 
conflict between Israel and Syria. The Syrians constructed a complicated integrated air 
defense system (IADS). SAM and AAA sites were placed to build a forceful defense wall 
against attacks. In response, the Israelis developed a new tactic in the SEAD mission. 
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They used a combination of drones and aircrafts. Drones were flown as decoys to make 
SAM radars active and then SEAD aircrafts were used to employ standoff weapons.                        
The next major application of the SEAD mission was the Gulf War. As opposed 
to Syrian air defenses in 1982, Iraq had gathered an impressive amount of sophisticated 
equipment for their IADS, including both Soviet and European systems. It consisted of 
several thousand radars, approximately 10,000 pieces of AAA, up to 17,000 SAMs, and 
the seventh largest air force in the world (Brungess, 1994: 38). The major concern was to 
destroy or disrupt command and control centers, communication and electrical facilities 
of the Iraqi IADS instead of directly attacking the SAM sites. The SEAD packages were 
formed of F-4G high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) shooters, EA-6B electronic 
jammers, and a large number of drones to support other air strikes. The air campaign 
resulted in a disintegrated Iraqi IADS in the first two days by destroying or making 
inoperative many of the radars and SAM sites. 
The last major example of SEAD operations was one of the most challenging of 
SEAD missions. In Kosovo, Serbians performed new tactics that they learned from 
Iraqi’s experience. Instead of continuously operating their systems, they chose to change 
the locations of their mobile SAMs continuously and activate them intermittently. That 
fact protected their SAMs from exposure to NATO attacks. It also gave Serbian SAMs 
the chance to launch surprise attacks on the Allied Forces aircraft, resulting in the loss of 
an F-117 and F-16. This was resulted in that although strike aircraft were not always 
threatened, there was a requirement for a full complement of NATO SEAD assets 
airborne to support every strike package (Lum, 1999: 38). 
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Since the first use of aircraft in combat and the first response given from the 
ground, it was obvious that the fight between aircraft and air defense would continue for 
a long time. This is evident today with the continuing development of new weapons and 
improved tactics. Going forward into the 21st century SEAD missions will continue to 
mature with specialized aircraft to execute these important parts of the air campaign.  
  
1.2  Research Problem 
 Contemporary military campaigns increasingly count on the use of air power. 
SEAD operations have been a crucial element of military air campaigns for 50 years. 
Several developments and evolution in both air defense and attack systems suggest that 
SEAD missions will continue to have growing importance to air forces. Twenty to thirty 
percent of all combat sorties in the recent three major conflicts were devoted to SEAD 
missions (Bolkcom, 2005: 5). Since SEAD operations have a significant impact on air 
campaigns, it is a necessity to determine their efficiency and improvement opportunities.        
 
1.3  Research Objective 
 This study describes a method for modeling SEAD air combat operations in a 
discrete event simulation environment. The objective of this research is to present a 
flexible and responsive model by using discrete-event simulation to investigate the means 
of neutralizing, degrading, jamming or destroying ground-based air defense systems.  
Researching the efficiency of missions and commenting on the results for different 
scenarios are additional objectives of this study.    
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1.4  Thesis Organization 
 This thesis is organized in five chapters. Chapter two reviews simulation 
literature, combat modeling, and previous studies on related subjects. Chapter three 
defines the structure of the model, how it is built in Arena®, and gives some detailed 
information of the model. In chapter four, model results and conclusions are presented. 
The last chapter pulls together highlights from all chapters and makes some conclusions 
and recommendations for future research.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
2.1  Systems and Models 
 A system is defined to be a collection of entities or components that interact with 
each other and with the environment in an attempt to achieve some goal (Hartman, 1985). 
Military systems fall into this defined category. The entities or components of the 
military systems might be aircraft, weapons, troops, or various sized units such as 
squadrons or battalions. 
 Systems can be categorized in two types, discrete and continuous. A discrete 
system is one for which the state variables change instantaneously at separated points in 
time. A continuous system is one for which the state variables change continuously with 
respect to time (Law, 2007: 70). If an aircraft is taken into consideration, it moves 
through the air in continuous time, but it can be modeled using a discrete event model to 
gain the convenience of computer programming and efficiency of computer operation 
(Hartman, 1985). Only a few systems are totally discrete or continuous but can typically 
be modeled as either to achieve the objectives of the study. 
 We often usually study complex systems to discover the characteristics of how 
they operate. A common objective in these studies is to analyze the behavior of the 
systems when different conditions or inputs are applied. With these studies we can gain 
information about the internal processes and relationships between the components of the 
systems. Thus we can make some predictions about the performance of the systems under 
new and untested conditions. Figure 1 (Law, 2007: 4) shows different ways in which a  
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Figure 1.  Ways to study a system (Law, 2007: 4) 
system might be studied. Our discussion focuses on cases where we cannot experiment 
with the actual system. If it is possible and cost-effective to build a physical model of the 
system this can be the best way to get valid results for system performance under new 
conditions. For many systems such as military operations, it is not feasible to build a 
physical model of the system being studied. For these reasons, the behavior of military 
systems by means of mathematical modeling is studied.  
 A model of a real system is a representation of some of the components of the 
system and of some of their actions and interrelationships which is useful for describing 
or predicting the behavior of the system (within a reasonable range of inputs) (Hartman, 
1985). When using a model, an important question to be answered is the validity of the 
model. Since no model can represent the real system perfectly, how closely it reflects the 
system and the accuracy of the outputs in regards to the model’s purpose are the main 
issues for validity. Validity will be discussed in more detail later. 
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 After deciding to construct a mathematical model of a system, the next step is to 
determine whether an analytical solution or simulation is more appropriate. If the model 
is simple enough, exact analytical solutions can be reached. But if an analytical solution 
to a mathematical model is not available or if such a solution requires a large amount of 
time and/or other resources, simulation emerges as the preferred method. Since most 
military systems are highly complex, it is generally impossible to model them using an 
analytical approach. Therefore, simulations are used in the analysis of military systems. 
 
2.2  Combat Models and Their Classification 
 As defined before, a model is a simplified representation of some components of a 
system and some of their interactions which is useful in describing or predicting the 
behavior of the system. A combat model, usually a simulation model, is specialized to 
capture elements of military operations for investigative purposes or resources 
management purposes (Miller: Class handouts, OPER 671). It is useful and helpful to 
classify combat models for a better understanding. Although there are several ways to 
make this classification, Hartman’s (1985) classification is used to classify them in this 
study. 
 
Dynamic vs. Static   
 A static model represents a system at only a particular time, or represents a 
system where time has no effect. On the other hand, a dynamic model represents a system 
where time clearly plays a role. Monte Carlo models and a model of the lethality of a 
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single missile could be given as examples of static models. Most operational models and 
modeling of air combat are dynamic models. 
 
Continuous vs. Discrete 
 In continuous models, state variables change continuously with respect to time. In 
discrete models, the state variables change instantaneously at separate points in time. In 
other words, the system can change at only a countable number of points in time. A 
discrete model can be used to model a continuous system. Many combat processes are 
continuous, but can be modeled using a discrete event model. The specific objectives of 
the study and the preference of the personnel programming the simulation are the main 
reasons in selecting a discrete model over a continuous model or vice versa. Although 
there are several examples of simulation software such as Simulink® and ACSL for 
building continuous models, the discrete-event simulation (DES) package Arena® as 
well as other commercial DES packages have continuous modeling capabilities as well.   
 
Deterministic vs. Stochastic       
 If a model does not contain any probabilistic components or random effects, it is 
called deterministic. In a stochastic model, there is always some random input or process. 
If a missile is shot with the same parameters each time and it reaches the target in the 
same way, this model is deterministic. If the impact point is not known, then the accuracy 
of the missile might be modeled stochastically. A model can have both deterministic and 
stochastic inputs in different components to simulate both the certainty and randomness 
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of real life. If any portion of a system is modeled stochastically, the output of the model 
is also stochastic. 
 
Descriptive vs. Prescriptive 
 A descriptive model describes how a system will operate if values for all of the 
input variables and decision rules are given by the model user (Hartman, 1985).  
Queueing models, inventory models and most combat simulation models are descriptive. 
A weaponeering program used to evaluate different munitions against a specific target to 
achieve the highest probability of kill (Pk) is an example of a descriptive model. A 
prescriptive model specifies how the system ought to operate to achieve some objective 
(Hartman, 1985).  Prescriptive models are optimization problems with decision variables 
determined by solving the model for the given parameters of the problem. Linear 
programming, integer programming and network problem models are prescriptive 
models. A weaponeering program could also be used as a prescriptive model if you allow 
the model to select a weapon/target pairing given an objective function and constraints. 
 
High Resolution vs. Aggregated  
 Combat models can also be classified by scope. Combat models are typically 
grouped using a multi-tiered or hierarchical family of models. This model hierarchy 
(Figure 2) is often displayed as a pyramid (Miller: Class handouts, OPER 671).  
 In this model hierarchy, combat models are placed at levels based on resolution 
and aggregation. Resolution is the degree of detail and precision used in the 
representation of real world aspects in a model or simulation (Department of Defense, 
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1995). A high resolution combat model (engineering level) is a combination of detailed 
interactions of individual combatants or weapon systems. The lowest level of the pyramid 
contains engineering levels of the detailed system representations. The next level presents 
the system as a combination of these detailed sub-units and includes the details of an 
engagement between a small number of platforms. 
 
CAMPAIGN 
MISSION 
ENGAGEMENT 
ENGINEERING 
Increasing 
Aggregation Higher Resolution 
 
Figure 2. Combat Model Hierarchy 
Above that, the mission level contains models where the systems begin to interact 
with a larger number of other systems. This level represents multiple-unit engagements or 
battles. These kinds of models give the operational performance of the systems. At the 
top of the pyramid, we find aggregated or low resolution combat models developed to 
model combat at the campaign level. An aggregated combat model is a model of larger 
units gathered from individual combatants with the loss of some detailed information. At 
this level, a major theatre war including joint and coalition forces over an extended 
period of time could be modeled.   
At the bottom of the pyramid, high resolution models show the detailed 
representation of combat and represent small units. As we move up the pyramid, some 
11 
details are left out and the models become more abstract and entities begin to represent 
larger units. Similarly, as we move from bottom to the top of the pyramid the stochastic 
structure of high resolution models shifts into a more deterministic type of aggregated 
models.  
Weapon versus passive target models are generally engineering level models to 
discover the accuracy and lethality of a weapon system against particular targets by 
emphasizing its hardware characteristics. One-on-one or few-on-few models are usually 
stochastic models between representing weapon systems in simplified engagement 
scenarios to represent the tradeoffs between the weapon systems. Combined arms task 
force models are generally stochastic and high resolution models that represent individual 
combatants and their detailed interactions at battalion level. The emphasis of these 
models is to determine the contribution of a particular system to overall force 
effectiveness. Mission specialty models represent a high resolution of a particular aspect 
or capability of a unit while considering the remaining capabilities of the same unit in 
less detail. Division level force models emphasize the force structure and the command 
and control functions of a division, since a division is the lowest level organization which 
has its own fire support and logistics. Campaign models have the largest number of 
participants including land, air, and naval combatants. The scenarios can last for months, 
thus deployment and logistics sides of war should be taken into consideration in these 
models. These models are highly aggregated and often deterministic with an emphasis on 
logistics, allocation and command and control of forces.    
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2.3  The Uses and Purposes of Combat Models 
Combat models have a wide range of variety and uses. Today many countries’ 
armed forces use combat modeling. Combat modeling as a tool for decision making can 
provide a more economic and effective means to evaluate alternatives and as an aid in 
determining appropriate force structures and capabilities. In addition, combat models can 
be used to educate staff officers and as a training aid in many different areas. 
As the technology develops, new military weapon systems continue to improve 
and the cost of them continues to increase. While optimizing the design and maintaining 
the quality, reducing these costs is a principle area of concern for many countries. 
Combat modeling and simulation is one of the ways to approach this problem. New 
weapon systems and justifications are usually modeled by high resolution models. These 
models give a high level of description of the new systems using a variety of stochastic 
components. At the same time, they help in understanding the contribution of the system 
to mission effectiveness. These models may also be used to help evaluate new and 
modified tactics for the operators (Hartman, 1985). Different tactical developments can 
be tried and evaluated to find out the best or most effective under various conditions. 
  Combat models are also used to analyze the ability of different types of forces and 
major weapon systems for total force structuring. To understand the contribution of an 
existing unit or new weapon system, it can be modeled in a campaign level model. Such 
models can be used to evaluate unit size and composition to provide decision makers with 
a better idea about the structure and capability of the total force. 
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 Another major area where combat models can be used is for training personnel. 
These models can contain military tasks to be evaluated and practiced by a specific staff. 
Models used for training often run in real time and allow for human interaction.  
Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) is a simulation architecture used by the 
military for conducting real-time platform level war gaming across multiple host 
computers. It was first designed in support of the US Army Simulator Network 
(SIMNET) program for tank training by the sponsorship of the United States Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) in the early 1990’s. DIS consists of 
autonomous simulation entities such as battlefield, environment, and simulation support 
entities interacting in real time across networks. DIS transmits only the information for 
change in the state of entities across networks. It provides an open architecture where 
anyone can play. It is operable among different, virtual, live and constructive simulations. 
It facilitates development, training, mission planning and rehearsal. 
 As described above, different uses of combat models intend to achieve particular 
purposes. Military analysts frequently use models to evaluate future combat systems. For 
any combat modeling study there is always a tradeoff between time, cost and risk. Time 
may be the most limited resource in searching for the best answer for an ongoing combat 
operation or for training personnel in a specific task within a constrained environment. 
Cost-efficiency is a crucial concern in many Operations Research (OR) studies. Since 
military technology is the most expensive industrial area in the world, achieving the best 
capability at the lowest cost is a great challenge for the researchers and developers.  The 
risk of being unsuccessful in combat clearly has a large impact on combat attrition. 
Combat models can be used to better understand what factors affect the level of risk and 
14 
how to reduce it.  Although a model is not a perfect and exact representation of the real 
world, it can still provide insight on the relative merits of various courses of action for the 
decision maker. 
Thus, the purposes of combat modeling can be summarized in two basic 
categories; analysis and training. Studies regarding development and effectiveness of 
weapon systems, force capability, and development of tactics, doctrine, strategy and 
policy are all common analysis areas. Another analysis area is operations support tools 
for helping to make decisions. In the training or education part, there are two main parts. 
One of them is the skills development for individuals or teams and the other is exercise 
drivers.  
 
2.4  Model Verification, Validation and Accreditation 
 One of the most difficult concerns in modeling that developers or users of these 
models have to face is determining whether a model is an accurate representation of the 
actual system. This problem can be solved by the steps of verification, validation and 
accreditation (VV&A).  
Model verification is the process of determining that a model implementation and 
its associated data accurately represent the developer's conceptual description and 
specifications (Department of Defense, 1995: A-8). Debugging the simulation computer 
program is a simple form of verification. In essence, verification seeks to ensure that the 
model is built right. 
Model validation is the process of determining the degree to which a model and 
its associated data provide an accurate representation of the real world from the 
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perspective of the intended uses of the model (Department of Defense, 1995: A-8). In 
short, validation ensures that the right model was built. If a simulation is valid, then it can 
be used to make decisions about the system. An important point about model validity is 
that a valid model for one purpose may not be valid for another. Simulation models 
should always be built for specific purposes. Another important point about validation is 
that it is not a one time process undertaken at the end of model development, but an 
ongoing process conducted throughout model development. 
Accreditation is a concept introduced by U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in 
recent years. It is the official certification by a model user that a model, simulation, or 
federation of models and simulations and its associated data is acceptable for use for a 
specific purpose (Department of Defense, 1995: A-8). Accreditation assures that the 
model user takes responsibility for the decision to employ a model for a particular 
application and to make official conclusions based upon model results.  
Credibility is also a related principle. If decision makers accept a simulation 
model and its results as correct and are willing to use the model results, that model can be 
deemed as credible. A credible model is not necessarily valid, and it might not be used as 
an aid in making decisions. In essence, credibility implies that the model provides 
believable results and is strongly influenced by model use by other organizations. 
 There are four basic approaches for deciding whether a simulation model is valid. 
Each of the approaches requires the model development team to conduct verification and 
validation (V&V) as part of the model development process (Sargent, 2005). In the first 
approach, which is frequently used, the model development team makes the V&V 
determination. Another approach leaves the V&V determination with the users of the 
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model. The third approach uses an outside team independent of both developers and users 
of the model to make the V&V decision. The last and rarely used approach incorporates a 
scoring model with subjective scores or weights for various aspects of the model and then 
accepts the model as valid if overall score meets or exceeds some passing score.   
Some of the verification and validation techniques are presented here. Common 
verification techniques include writing and debugging a simulation program in 
subprograms, reviewing the program with more than one person, and running the model 
under several sets of input parameters and checking the results for reasonableness. One of 
the most powerful techniques that can be used to debug a discrete-event simulation 
program is a trace (Law, 2007: 249). In a trace, the states of the system are compared 
with hand calculations to check the operations of the program continue as intended.  
Operational validation is determining whether the simulation model’s output 
behavior has the accuracy required for the model’s intended purpose over the domain of 
the model’s intended applicability (Sargent, 2005). There are three basic approaches to 
make these comparisons. The first one is subjective using graphical comparisons such as 
histograms, box plots and scatter plots. Confidence intervals (CI) and hypothesis tests are 
the remaining two approaches that provide more reliable and objective results. Both 
confidence intervals and hypothesis tests can be used to compare means, variances, and 
distributions of the model outputs against the system outputs.  
 
2.5  Previous Research      
 Many simulations involving air combat are modeled using special combat 
modeling software tools. These combat modeling tools are often produced for only US 
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release which means limited application. The software used in this study, Arena® is a 
discrete-event simulation (DES) package and has no restrictions for use by Non-US 
students. Our discussion focuses on some research about air defense and SEAD that does 
not use special purpose combat models. 
 Measuring the effectiveness of radar and infrared sensors in anti-air warfare area 
defense (Kulac, 1999) is an example of component-based DES developed in Java® using 
the Simkit simulation package. Analysis of ship self air defense system selection (Turan, 
1999) is another Java® application using the Modkit simulation package.  
A simulation analysis of a SEAD operation (Haugen, 1998) is another application 
of Simkit. Haugen conducted a study to evaluate the impact of intelligence delay on a 
SEAD operation. The results showed that the effectiveness of a SEAD operation is 
sensitive to information delay but the effective variable is the number of allocated SEAD 
aircraft. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) mission level simulation (Walston, 1999) is a 
DES study written in Java® using the Silk® simulation package. In that research, an 
object oriented simulation was developed to model the surveillance and active SEAD 
missions of UAVs. Analysis examined the effect of speed, endurance, and weather 
susceptibility on UAV operational effectiveness and the effects of radar cross section, 
threat density, and threat lethality on UAV SEAD mission performance. 
Simulation analysis of UAV (Heath, 1999) is another DES example for an air 
platform. Analyzing mine avoidance tactics for autonomous underwater vehicles (Allen, 
2004), dynamic allocation of weapons and sensors to ground targets (Havens, 2002), and 
waterfront force protection (Childs, 2002) are some other studies relating movement and 
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detection in DES. Simulation of autonomic logistics system sortie generation (Faas, 
2003) and a DES model for reusable military launch vehicle prelaunch operations 
(Stiegelmeier, 2006) are some combat models built with Arena® .  
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III. Methodology 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 This chapter describes the discrete event simulation model of a SEAD mission 
built for this research effort.  It gives an overview of a simplified scenario which SEAD 
missions are tasked to attack an air defense system. The following sections contain model 
selection, model structure and description, and several assumptions made in the model. 
 
3.2  Model Selection  
 The purpose of building a simulation model is to create a tool that produces 
necessary data for the researchers. Thus, selecting a model should be as simple as 
possible, but at the same time it should give a sufficient level of detail. The researcher has 
two options in this sense; one of them is to use an existing model and the other is to 
develop a new one. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are not many examples 
where a researcher builds a combat model from scratch using discrete event simulation 
software. On the other hand, the Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit (AFSAT) contains 
a number of legacy models designed to model combat at the engagement and mission 
level. One of these models is Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM). This model 
is a mission level simulation used to assess effectiveness of many defense systems. It can 
be used to model a variety of scenarios including SEAD missions and other air defense 
operations. Another mission level model is System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation 
(SEAS) which helps to assess the impact of proposed systems in terms of high level 
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combat outcomes. However, these models have important disadvantages such as being 
very large and complex. Many of these combat modeling tools were produced with 
limited release outside of the US and is not necessarily available to international students.         
 The simulation model in this research was developed in the Arena® software 
package which is a commercial tool and available to all students. It is a discrete event 
simulation model designed for analyzing the performance of and the impact of changes 
on complex systems associated with supply chain, manufacturing, logistics, distribution 
and warehousing, and other areas. In the following sections, we present how a combat 
model was built in Arena® and the other details about a SEAD mission.  
 
3.3  Model Description and Structure    
 Mission success is generally evaluated by two important measures in air to ground 
(A/G) employment. These two factors are target destruction and force survival. There are 
also several basic factors to be taken into consideration while planning A/G missions, 
such as enemy defenses, terrain, weather, target vulnerability, force requirements, 
navigation, and formations. There is no single approved solution to any tactical situation. 
Choosing reasonable, unpredictable tactics is the key in planning any A/G mission.  
A/G missions can be created by flight packages with more than one flight or type 
of aircraft. Each flight must understand the mission objectives to be successful. There are 
two basic objectives for A/G missions. These objectives are target destruction and force 
survival where they influence flight planning through all phases of the mission. Factors 
considered during the mission planning process include mission objectives given in the 
air tasking order (ATO), rules of engagement (ROE) or special instructions (SPINS), 
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intelligence information, weather, terrain, weaponeering, navigation, communication, 
force requirements, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). If attackers are 
tasked to enter a threat ring or attack a threat site, they have to plan the mission with 
available SEAD assets. If there are no SEAD assets available to be tasked, an alternative 
way is tasking some of the allocated forces to the SEAD role. At this point, the vital role 
of SEAD missions and attacking a threat with or without SEAD assets can be noticed 
easily.  
Offensive counter air (OCA) operations are aimed against essential targets of the  
enemy's air power. These targets include air defense control facilities; defensive missile 
complexes; command, control, communications, and computer (C4) facilities; airfield 
and supporting facilities; aircraft on the ground; and munitions and missile storage sites. 
OCA missions against air defense elements are called suppression of enemy air defenses 
(SEAD) which seeks to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy surface based 
air defenses by disruptive or destructive means. Disruptive SEAD involves a temporary 
disruption of enemy air defense assets. Employing a high speed anti-radiation missile 
(HARM), electronic warfare (EW), and information attack (IA) are the execution types of 
disruptive SEAD. EW involves the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control 
the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy such as jamming or deception, and 
employment of anti-radiation weapons or weapons using electromagnetic energy. 
Destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) is one step beyond suppression and includes 
the physical destruction of enemy air defense assets through the use of conventional 
bombs and contemporary weapons such as cruise missiles. However, DEAD was not 
explicitly considered in this study. 
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 Building a model is an art and requires a conscious effort. The modeler must 
make good decisions in selecting the right functional relationships, the best modeling 
techniques, the right scenarios, and the sources of inputs to get accurate results to aid the 
decision maker in forming conclusions about the system being modeled. Thus, the 
modeler should have knowledge of the simulation tool and an experience in the military 
operation to be modeled. After combining these factors, the modeler first takes steps to 
design the structure of a combat model. These include determining the purpose of the 
study, generating the appropriate combat scenario, defining the entities, their attributes 
(characteristics) and the events related to them. Once the model structure is defined, the 
modeler moves on to execution details such as battle initialization, specific processes to 
model (such as search, movement, and detection), battle termination, and required model 
outputs. 
This structure gives an idea about the main processes of a combat model and how 
these processes are flowing in an existing model. A successful combat model scenario 
usually creates entities which perform the main processes: movement, searching, 
detecting and engaging. This provides the same logic and flow chart for each combatant 
side of the model (Figure 3). 
A simplified SEAD mission was developed in Arena® for this research. This 
model is used to discover relationships and derive conclusions depending on input 
parameters. It is designed for analysis, with no objective concerning training. The model 
can’t be interrupted or given different directions after execution begins. The current 
version of the model doesn’t have a Graphical User Interface (GUI). As a result, all input 
parameters must be set directly in the code.  
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 Figure 3. The Decision Making Flow Chart (Miller: Class handouts, OPER 671) 
This model is dynamic and has an event stepped time mechanism. It represents 
both stochastic and deterministic features with its characteristics. While constructing the 
model, most of the effort was consumed to get a realistic as well as a flexible model. But 
building a more realistic model means the modeler must include more details. Thus, some 
assumptions were made to keep the model simple and responsive. These assumptions will 
be explained in the following section. 
            
3.4  Model Assumptions and Details 
 When executing an air strike or an air-to-surface offensive counter air mission 
against specific targets in the battle area, the mission commander needs different types of 
aircraft and flights to compose a traditional package to ensure minimum attrition. SEAD 
and EW aircraft, air to air (A/A) and air to ground (A/G) flights are some typical 
24 
examples of a package. This model deals with only the units that carry and launch air to 
surface weapons for attackers and air defense units that carry and launch surface to air 
weapons for defenders. 
A two-sided (Blue and Red) combat model was built for this research. The entities 
created for both Blue and Red are complete weapon systems that have some attributes 
and can move and interact with entities from the other side. The battle area is defined to 
be 100x100x5 miles and is represented in a x-y-z coordinate system. The geographic 
positions of both sides do not have an impact on the results of the battle with the Blue 
side located on the east side of the area and attack in the direction from east to west. Also 
there are no obstacles assumed to create any terrain factor. The battle time is determined 
as 10 days. There are three sorties flown each day and after each sortie both units are 
regenerated disregarding previous sortie attrition.       
The main model consists of two major parts and an additional part to capture the 
outputs (Figure 4). In the first part, the Red SAM sites, the Red targets and the Blue A/G 
flights associated with these targets are created. HARMs, the search and attack patterns 
of both the Red air defense units and HARMs and the movement and attack phases of 
Blue A/G flights are built in the second part. The following paragraphs will go into detail 
about these two major parts. 
In the first part, the entities are the units of air defense systems for the Red side.  
Basically, an air defense system has different categories of units. These include early 
warning, air surveillance, ground control intercept (GCI), SAM system acquisition, SAM 
system fire control, AAA fire control radars, engagement control stations, missile launch 
stations, and long, medium or short range SAMs according to the capability of the  
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Figure 4. Main model 
system. Since HARMs are anti-radiation missiles, the radars are the primary concerns and 
targets of SEAD flights. There are no particularly named air defense systems, weapons or 
aircrafts in this model. All of the players were intuitively created and given their 
important specifications only in numbers. 
The Red air defense system is tasked to defend an area 100 x 100 miles with two 
SAM sites. This does not mean all the area should be covered by the defense umbrella. 
All air defense units are considered mobile, but they need to be stationary to operate. For 
each sortie, the defense systems are settled on a random location to defend two, four, or 
six strategic targets against SEAD and A/G flights (Figure 5). Those specific locations of 
the air defense systems were used as the main target positions for HARMs and missile 
launcher positions for A/G flights to avoid. The ranges of SAM sites are also determined 
randomly for each sortie. Although the ranges of two SAM sites are different from each 
other, the search patterns and the probabilities of detection and kill are the same. 
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 Figure 5. SAM Positions Submodel  
 
After generating air defense systems and strategic targets, the Blue side attacking 
units and their initial positions were created according to the related targets (Figure 6). 
For each target, four Blue A/G attack aircraft are created. All targets are placed randomly 
in the range of the air defense system. This implies every A/G flight has to enter the area  
 
Figure 6. Targets and Strikers Submodel  
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in the range of the air defense system and become vulnerable to missiles of air defense 
systems. At the same time, Red air defense systems have to be exposed to Blue HARM 
missiles when they are trying to defend their strategic assets by operating their radars and 
attacking Blue A/G flights with their missiles. Thus a combat environment and attrition 
for both sides are created in the model.  
In the same assignment modules, mathematical calculations are made for attackers 
(Figure 7). These are the calculations of vector velocities of attackers that help to move 
on to their assigned targets, calculations of times indicating when the attackers can reach 
to their targets, enter the threat zone and exit it. The A/G aircraft are assumed to fly at a 
constant velocity of 480 knots and execute a low altitude operation at 500 feet above 
ground level (AGL). A/G flights also fly in an offset box formation to make a time and 
altitude deconfliction between the elements. There is also some important information 
gathered for SEAD flights to help them generate a timeline for HARM launches in the 
second major part of the model. 
 
Figure 7. Calculation Assign Modules for A/G Aircraft  
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In the other part of the model, the entities are Blue HARMs that interact with the 
air defense systems of the Red side. These missiles are being launched from SEAD 
aircraft which are not modeled as separate entities. SEAD flight carries and launches 
eight missiles at each run. They usually do not enter the range of the threat and get 
exposed to the Red air defense missiles. They are assumed to form an imaginary box in 
the air which is called a SEAD box to provide deconfliction with the other Blue flights. 
SEAD aircraft are not involved with the battle directly, thus they are not vulnerable to the 
SAMs of the Red side.  
After HARMs are created as entities for Blue side, there is a decide module to 
demonstrate the probability of some failures with HARM missiles or SEAD aircrafts. 
This module cancels some missiles by chance and shows the effect of an unplanned 
failure of missiles in the air during combat (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. HARM Failure Rate Submodel 
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Afterwards, the allocation of HARMs to every SAM site is accomplished related 
to the A/G vulnerable times calculated in the first part of the model (Figure 9). Logic 
changes are associated with vulnerability times of attackers and make the distribution in 
three different ways. The eight HARMs are divided into 6 to 2, 5 to 3 and 4 to 4 missiles 
for each SAM site. This process also contains the calculations of time over targets (TOT) 
of each missile against Red SAM sites. HARMs are not launched reactively. The 
accuracy and flow of intelligence information and electronic order of battle (EOB) 
updates are assumed to be at a sufficient degree to make SEAD flights plan their shots 
prior to vulnerable times of A/G aircraft. Thus, all eight HARMs are already launched 
even if both SAM sites are hit by previous missiles.  
  
Figure 9. HARM Allocations Submodel 
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SEAD flight takes an initial launch position in the battle area according to the 
locations of the Red air defense units for the first HARM. After that they move to a new 
position in a calculated time which is related to the velocity of SEAD aircraft and the 
time between two consecutive HARM shots for the remaining shots. They remain in their 
SEAD box while they are making their orbits and preparing for new launches (Figure 
10). 
 
Figure 10. SEAD Box Submodel 
SEAD flight determines the location of the SEAD box to bring the flight as near 
as possible to both SAM sites without entering Red missile ranges. There are two options 
to determine the location of the SEAD box. One is from the north and the other is from 
the east. There is logic to determine the placement of the box according to the locations 
and ranges of SAM sites to get the nearest and safe position (Figure 11). 
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 Figure 11. Logic of SEAD Box Location 
 
After determining all the first locations of SAM sites, targets, A/G and SEAD 
flights and getting all the calculations related to time for A/G flight and HARM TOTs, 
the combat begins. The search and detection process of SAM sites continues from the 
first aircraft’s entering time to threat area until the last aircraft’s egress time (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12. SAM & HARM Search Patterns Submodel 
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In this scenario, the air defense units are attacked by only SEAD aircraft carrying 
HARMs. Other types of military units playing a role in a SEAD mission are omitted. 
There are no other DEAD or A/G attacking assets carrying weapons to destroy air 
defense system units. EW assets only protect the SEAD flight and they are not assigned 
to destroy enemy air defense units. 
The attackers were considered with their conventional or modern weapons against 
only Red A/G targets in the range of air defense units. SAM sites can only engage the 
attacking aircraft. Red air defense units cannot operate all the time because of the threat 
of HARMs. A stochastic detection model was developed for their operation. Their 
operational time is simulated by a triangular distribution. SAM sites are assumed to get a 
lock on only one target and launch one missile at a time. They can get different detection 
opportunities referred to as glimpses related to time intervals between search patterns. 
There is also another associated probability that varies in accordance with the skill level 
of SAM operators. For instance, a high level operator needs less time than a low level 
operator to detect and get a lock on the target.  
After making detection, the operators launch a missile to hit the Blue attackers. 
They can engage just one target at each shot. The probability of detection depends on the 
distance and directions of the aircraft to the SAM sites. Once entering the threat area, the 
Blue attackers have a high probability of being hit by SAMs because they are moving 
toward the threat. The aircraft fly on a smooth surface and are not terrain masked. They 
are not assumed to make any defensive maneuver against SAM locks and launches which 
results in more attrition for the Blue side. On the other side, while executing the egress 
phase, their speed will be higher and they will show the aft of their aircraft which 
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decreases the probability of detection. Different values of probability of detection were 
applied to ingress and egress phases of the attack.  
 
3.5  Movement and Detection in DES 
Movement and detection are crucial issues that should be taken into consideration 
while building a combat model using a discrete event tool. Most of the time, both 
movement and detection have been done in time-stepped models. Time does not advance 
in regular intervals in discrete event simulation as the simulation time is moved to the 
time of next event. Although it seems hard and infeasible, there is a way to do both 
movement and detection in a discrete event approach (Buss and Sanchez, 2005).  
In this research, there are SEAD flights and A/G attackers moving after the start 
of battle. They are assumed to fly at a constant speed of 480 knots and at a fixed altitude 
of 20,000 feet for SEAD aircraft and 500 feet for attackers. They have a linear two 
dimensional motion which is the simplest possible movement in a discrete event 
simulation.  
Any aircraft starts its move at an initial position x0 related to its assigned target at 
the beginning time of the battle t0 with a constant velocity vector v. The velocity vector is 
computed related to the assigned targets of the aircraft to ensure they proceed to their 
targets. Storing initial position, time to start moving, and velocity vector of any moving 
entity are enough to determine the new location of the aircraft. The new location of any 
aircraft at time t will be computed by this equation of motion:  
 ( )vttx r00 −+      (1) 
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To find the TOT of an attacker, relative velocity is used. Since the target is stationary and 
its velocity is zero, the equation of motion relative to the target will give the TOT:  
        
( )
ag
tgtag
v
xx
t r
−=      (2)                                      
There is no need to store current locations of the aircraft at all times since they are not 
being detected every second of the simulation time. These computations are made only 
when a SAM site has an opportunity to detect and ask the location of the aircraft.  
The cookie-cutter sensor is the simplest way of detection in a discrete event 
modeling, and is used in this study (Buss and Sanchez, 2005). Air defense units should 
not move while operating, that means the sensors of the SAM sites are stationary and 
each of A/G attacking aircrafts are the moving targets. Again at time t0 the aircraft starts 
at point xo and proceeds with velocity vector v to its target. It is important to note that 
position and velocity calculations are made relative to the sensor. The main concern is to 
find the detection time td at which the aircraft enters the sensor’s range. The position of 
the aircraft at the time of detection is given by the following formula.  
vtx d
r+0      (3) 
The detection will occur when the distance between aircraft and sensor equals the range, 
R, of the sensor. Thus equation 3 becomes 
vtx r+0      (4) 
Then by completing the calculation of the length of this vector gives the solution to td 
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With the condition that the expression under the radical being non-negative, this equation 
will give two real and positive values for t. The smaller value is the answer for time 
detection td  and the bigger one is for the egress time that aircraft exits the threat range te.  
There is only one exception from the cookie-cutter logic in this model. After the 
aircraft come upon their targets and drop their weapons, they do not follow the same 
direction in the threat area to move on as seen in the Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. Cookie-Cutter Detection 
To decrease the vulnerability and the chance to be detected by SAM sites, they 
use a different velocity vector named egress vector in the model to accomplish egress 
phase as soon as possible.  They use the shortest path towards the safe area and minimize 
the total unprotected time in the threat zone.     
The movement of A/G flights and their detection by SAM sites is briefly 
described here. The detection of SAM sites by HARMs follow the same cookie-cutter 
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logic. This time the entity in the sensor role, HARM, is moving, and the player in the 
target role, SAM sites, are stationary. HARM sensor begins to search the location of the 
SAMs at a calculated amount of time after launch. When the sensor of HARM receives 
any emission by the threats, it begins homing to the target. Once the homing is initiated, 
it flies a dive trajectory and arms its proximity fuse until it approaches the target and hits 
the target. HARM also has flexible logic and chooses the next highest priority target in its 
target list if it doesn’t detect its primary target.  
 
3.6  Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we defined an overview of a simplified scenario of a SEAD 
mission. We described the reasons for selecting the software, steps taken while building 
our model in a DES environment, a brief detail of the model structure, and the 
assumptions made to make the model reasonable. Results and analysis from our model 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
IV. Results and Analysis  
 
4.1  Introduction 
 The previous chapter defined the model built for this research. This chapter 
includes model results and analysis. In the first section, the factors and output data used 
in the model are introduced and determining the appropriate length and number of 
replications of the model to produce these output data is explained. The following 
sections include the design of experiments (DOE) and regression analysis of the main 
model, comparisons made between different competing systems on the basis of key 
performance measures, and the analysis of responses from the model. 
 
4.2  Measures of Effectiveness 
 Various numbers of outputs could be obtained from a mission level simulation. 
The detailed model can easily give different performance measures from the results. In a 
combat environment, every unit has distinctive key measures to calculate their own 
performances. The performance values of each mission, number of attritions, number of 
ammunitions fired, number of targets detected, and number of targets destroyed are the 
most usual measures of effectiveness (MOE) in combat modeling. In this study, some of 
the outputs we captured are mission success for each mission, survivability score, overall 
success which is a combination of mission success values and survivability score, killed 
SAMs, detected A/G aircraft, killed A/G aircraft, killed targets, number of HARMs fired, 
total vulnerability time for A/G aircraft, total coverage time provided by SEAD flight.  
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Overall success (OS) is one of the most important MOEs considered in this 
research. As mentioned before, overall success is a calculated combination of the scores 
of each mission success and survivability. The mission success is calculated according to 
the number of targets killed by A/G strikers. The survivability score is another measure 
which gives the number of A/G strikers alive at the end of each sortie. Although the 
military commanders usually determine the weights of these measures related to the 
importance level of each one in the combat, the largest weight (75%) is given to mission 
success. These measures could practically be changed in the code when it’s required.  
The objective for half width variation for the mean of key MOEs is plus or minus 
1%. The main model was run for 10 days and three sorties were accomplished for each 
day which gives us 30 sorties per one replication. The length of one replication was 
determined related to the duration of operational exercises such as Red Flag or Anatolian 
Eagle. First we ran the model for ten replications and captured an estimated variance to 
implement that value into the following equation. This formula assumes that as we 
increase the number of replications our estimate of the population variance will not 
change and we can reach an approximate expression for the total number of replications 
required to achieve a desired half-width.                                 
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 na* is the number of additional replications needed to obtain a half width which is less 
than or equal to β  which is equal to one in this study. S2(n) denotes the variance with the 
present replication number and i denotes the iterative increase in the number of 
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replications. The number of replications were iteratively increased and finally reached the 
value of 25. 
 
4.3  Design of Experiments and Regression Analysis 
 After determining the number of replications and the replication length, the level 
of critical factors was determined that allow examination of the varying outputs. Four 
different main factors affected the outputs directly in the model. These factors are SAM 
on-air rate (SOR), HARM failure rate (HFR), skill level of SAM operators (SLO) in 
terms of seconds to react to A/G aircraft, and the number of A/G targets for each SAM 
site (NTG). These factors have two different levels for their low and high values. A 2k 
factorial design is constructed to determine which factor has the greatest impact on the 
process and the key MOE OS. Arena®’s Process Analyzer is used to capture the 
necessary outputs. The main factors and their low and high values are shown in Table 1. 
Only NTG used a center level with a value of 4. A 31x23 factorial design was constructed 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Main Factors and Levels 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
Factors Low  High  
SOR 50% 100% 
HFR 1% 25% 
SLO 30 sec. 10 sec. 
NTG 2 6 
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Table 2. Design Points 
NTG SOR SLO HFR 
2 50% 10 sec. 1% 
2 50% 10 sec. 25% 
2 50% 30 sec. 1% 
2 50% 30 sec. 25% 
2 100% 10 sec. 1% 
2 100% 10 sec. 25% 
2 100% 30 sec. 1% 
2 100% 30 sec. 25% 
4 50% 10 sec. 1% 
4 50% 10 sec. 25% 
4 50% 30 sec. 1% 
4 50% 30 sec. 25% 
4 100% 10 sec. 1% 
4 100% 10 sec. 25% 
4 100% 30 sec. 1% 
4 100% 30 sec. 25% 
6 50% 10 sec. 1% 
6 50% 10 sec. 25% 
6 50% 30 sec. 1% 
6 50% 30 sec. 25% 
6 100% 10 sec. 1% 
6 100% 10 sec. 25% 
6 100% 30 sec. 1% 
6 100% 30 sec. 25% 
 
After 25 replications of the model for each 24 design points, key response variable 
OS values were collected. All these input and output variables are implemented in a 
multiple linear regression model to find out the relationship between these variables and 
the response variable. Multiple linear regression model attempts to find out this 
relationship by fitting a linear equation to observed data. This linear equation provides a 
regression line which describes how the mean response changes with explanatory 
variables. The observed values for response variable vary about their means and are 
assumed to have the same standard deviation. The fitted values estimate the parameters of 
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the population regression line. Since the observed values vary about their means, the 
multiple regression model includes residuals for this variation. The residuals are the 
deviations of the observed values from their means, which are assumed to be normally 
and independently distributed with a mean of zero and some constant variance. These 
assumptions are checked later. 
By using Minitab statistical package, the stepwise regression technique is applied 
to determine which variables have a significant contribution to the multiple regression 
linear model. Four main factors in the model were applied first and had a very low 
predictive model. Interactions were added between these variables to obtain a more 
predictive model. Adding new variables to a regression equation will always increase our 
R2 value, which gives the proportion of the variability in the response that is fitted by the 
model, even when the new variables have no predictive capability. However, the adjusted 
R2 value corrects this difficulty. When new variables are added to the regression 
equation, the adjusted R2 value does not increase, if the new variables have no additional 
predictive capability.  
Other useful exploratory analysis tools for factorial experiments include main 
effects plots and interaction plots. Figure 14 shows the main effects plot for the response. 
This plot provides the information about how a factor contributes to the model without 
any interaction between the other factors. 
The end points of the lines are the mean of response values at high or low levels 
of that factor’s design points. The change in the mean of responses between levels of a 
factor is illustrated through the slopes of the lines. Usually slopes of the lines give the 
main idea of significance level of a factor on the response in these kinds of plots. A steep 
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increase between the means indicates that a factor has a significant effect on the response 
variable. A gradual change ends up with the conclusion of a minor effect on the response. 
HFR is as a good example of a gradual slope. HARM failure increases make little change 
in overall success. On the contrary, the other three factors show significant effects on the 
response with their steeper slopes. For NTG, increase in the number of targets gives a 
better result in the response. Although this increase generates new increases in the 
number of A/G aircraft and in the risk of attrition rate, it concludes a better score in 
overall success. 
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Figure 14. Main Effects Plot 
 On the other side, SOR another significant factor on the response introduces an 
interesting behavior. When the duration of on-air time of a SAM site increases, it will 
make a decrease in the response. Although the vulnerability of SAMs against HARMs 
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goes up, the response (overall success) drops off. Obviously SLO has the greatest effect 
on the response. As expected, the higher skill level makes a greater decrease in the 
response. On the contrary, lower skill level is almost completely unsuccessful.     
Figure 15 shows the interactions between two factors among each other and the 
response. The different shaded lines stand for each level of the first factor among two 
factors examined. The end points of each line represent the two levels of the second 
factor. The values at those end points correspond to the response values depending on 
these two factors.  
In the first subplot, we examined the NTG and SOR factors. There are three levels 
with three lines for NTG. The low and high levels of SOR are the end points of those 
lines. Their interaction between each factor determines the slope of that line and 
corresponding values on the right hand side represent the response variable OS. When  
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Figure 15. Interaction Plot for OS 
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NTG is at its low level which is the black line in this case, the high level of SOR is highly 
effective and make a great decrease in the response. When NTG level is increased, the 
same decrease in the response is observed as when higher levels of SOR are observed, 
but not as sharp slopes as seen in the first one. When SAM sites turn their systems on 
during the whole combat they can be more successful against the strikers, but their 
success is more evident with a low numbers of targets. When the number of targets 
increases, SAM sites cannot find enough time and chance to engage each target. 
 In the second subplot, we examined NTG and SLO factors interaction on the 
response. The value of 10 stands for the high-skilled SAM operators and 30 for low-
skilled ones. High level operators have a great impact on the decrease of overall success. 
As expected, low level SLO can’t be as successful as the high level. The same result as 
seen in the previous subplot provides the same conclusion. When the number of targets 
increases, the success for SAM sites will decrease. This provides the result of defending 
more than one target with one SAM site makes operators too busy to engage every target. 
 In the third subplot, NTG and HFR factors are analyzed. There is almost no slope 
for each line which means the HARM failure rate does not have a significant effect on the 
response. The only change among the three lines comes naturally from the NTG factor, as 
discussed the general impact of the change in the number of targets before. The same 
ineffectiveness can be observed from the other subplots of HFR on the third column. 
Independent of the other factors, HFR cannot make big differences in the response. In 
this case, being limited to only eight HARMs on each sortie and the failure rate values 
between the values of one and 25% do not make a crucial impact on the survivability of 
strikers. 
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 The last interaction plot examined is the combination of SOR and SLO factors. 
The higher level in SLO will give the worse result in response again. Also the high level 
in SOR will make the same impact on the response by decreasing the percentage of 
overall success. This means despite the fact that being more vulnerable to HARMs, SAM 
sites could find more chances to detect and kill their targets.                  
The interaction between variables was also analyzed. Table 3 shows the 
correlation values. 
Table 3. Correlation between the Variables  
  NTG SOR SLO HFR SOR*SLO SOR*HFR SOR*NTG NTG*SLO NTG*HFR SLO*HFR 
NTG 1.00                   
SOR 0.00 1.00                 
SLO 0.00 0.00 1.00               
HFR 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00             
SOR*SLO 0.00 0.53 0.80 0.00 1.00           
SOR*HFR 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.90 0.17 1.00         
SOR*NTG 0.75 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.20 1.00       
NTG*SLO 0.60 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.45 1.00     
NTG*HFR 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.77 0.28 0.23 1.00   
SLO*HFR 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.80 0.35 0.72 0.00 0.32 0.69 1.00 
 
  
The correlation between “SOR*HFR” and “HFR” is 0.90. Since they are highly 
correlated, addition of the variable “SOR*HFR” may not significantly improve the 
model. The other variables were also examined in the same way. After fitting the 
regression line to this equation, it is important to investigate the residuals which are the 
differences between the observed and predicted values to determine whether or not they 
appear to fit the assumption of a normal distribution. Normality is one of the three basic 
assumptions of these residuals. A normal probability plot of the standardized residuals is 
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shown in the Figure 16. Despite two small light departures on both tails in the data, the 
residuals do not seem to deviate from a normal distribution in any systematic manner. 
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Figure 16. Normal Probability Plot of Residuals 
 Residuals can be thought of as elements of variation unexplained by the fitted 
model. Thus the other basic assumption about residuals is constant variance is checked by 
a scatter plot, the residuals against the fitted values (Figure 17).  
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Figure 17. Residual plots vs. Fitted Values 
Plotting residuals versus the value of a fitted response should produce a 
distribution of points scattered randomly about zero, regardless of the size of the fitted 
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value. If residual values increase as the size of the fitted value increases, the residual 
cloud becomes "funnel shaped" with the larger end toward larger fitted values which 
means the residuals have a non-constant variance. Although the residuals make a dense 
distribution between the values 60 and 100, a funnel shaped residual cloud is not 
observed. The scatter in the residuals between 60 and 80 is similar to the scatter in the 
residuals between 80 and 100. This suggests that the standard deviation of the residuals is 
roughly constant for the responses observed at each value. 
After these steps, the regression model is reached. Minitab also provides a 
parameter table shown in Table 4 which helps to understand the variables that make a 
contribution to the model at different levels.    
SLONTGNTGSOR
SLOSORHFRSLOSORNTGOS
∗−∗
+∗−++−+=
15.006.0
01.016.075.223.033.208.40
 (7) 
Table 4. Parameter Estimates 
Predictor Coef. (β) Std.Err.of Coef. p-values 
Intercept 40.082 4.143 0.000 
NTG 2.3257 0.7864 0.010 
SOR -0.22849 0.04790 0.000 
SLO 2.7469 0.1373 0.000 
HFR 0.15828 0.09044 0.101 
SOR*SLO -0.011166 0.001373 0.000 
SOR*NTG 0.056522 0.008407 0.000 
NTG*SLO -0.14742 0.02102 0.000 
 
As seen on the first column, along with four main factors, three interaction 
variables also help to predict the response. The regression coefficients are shown in the 
second column. The third column contains the standard errors of the regression 
coefficients which can be used for hypothesis testing and constructing confidence 
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intervals. P-values or the significance levels for t statistics in the last column tell whether 
a variable has statistically significant predictive capability in the presence of the other 
variables. A p-value smaller than 0.05 means that variable is statistically significant in the 
model at the α = .05 level.  In some circumstances, a non-significant p-value might be 
used to determine whether to remove a variable from a model without significantly 
reducing the model's predictive capability. HFR has a non-significant p-value, however 
when it is removed, the model is less significant and the normality plot has larger 
deviations than the present one. These p-values should not be used to eliminate more than 
one variable at a time. A variable that does not have predictive capability in the presence 
of the other predictors may have predictive capability when some of those predictors are 
removed from the model. 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table (Table 5) explains the variability in the 
response variable. The amount of variability can be measured by the Total Sum of 
Squares. The ANOVA table partitions this variability into two parts. One portion is fitted 
by the regression model and labeled as Regression Sum of Squares. It's the reduction in 
uncertainty that occurs when the regression model is used to predict the responses. The 
remaining portion is the uncertainty that remains even after the model is used and labeled 
as Residual Error Sum of Squares. The model is considered to be statistically significant 
if it can account for a large amount of variability in the response.  
Table 5. Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio p-value 
Regression 8 6569.45 821.18 290.50 0.000 
Residual Error 15 42.40 2.83   
Total 23 6611.85    
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 Mean Squares are the Sums of Squares divided by the corresponding degrees of 
freedom. The F Ratio is the test statistic used to decide whether the model as a whole has 
statistically significant predictive capability. The null hypothesis states that all regression 
coefficients are equal to zero. In other words the model has no predictive capability. The 
large values of F statistic provide evidence against null hypothesis and at least one of the 
coefficients is different from zero. The p-value for the F statistic is less than 0.001, 
providing strong evidence against the null hypothesis.  
R2 value is the squared multiple correlation coefficient and gives the proportion of 
the variability in the response that is fitted by the model. In this regard, if a model has a 
perfect predictability R2 is equal to 1. The Summary of Fit shows these values in Table 6. 
As mentioned before the adjusted R2 value makes a correction to the increase in R2 value 
when new variables are added that have no additional predictive capability to the model. 
In this case, 99% of the variance in the response variable (OS) is explained by the model. 
The Root Mean Square Error is the square root of the Residual Mean Square. It is the 
standard deviation of the data about the regression line, rather than about the sample 
mean. 
Table 6. Summary of Fit 
R Square 0.994 
R Square adjusted 0.990 
Root Mean Square Error 1.683 
 
4.4  Comparison of Different Systems 
 In this section, statistical analyses of the output from two different versions of the 
main model that might represent competing system designs is discussed.” The real utility 
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of simulation lies in comparing output of these alternative systems” (Law, 2007:548). In 
this sense, appropriate statistical methods are essential in making correct conclusions. 
Two options to construct confidence intervals for the difference between two 
performance measures are available. One is the two-sample-t approach which requires 
independence and equal variances but not equal sample size between two systems. 
However, equality of variances might not necessarily be a good assumption when 
simulating real world systems such as mission level combat systems. Thus a paired-t test 
is the other option. The advantage of this approach is it does not require equal variance 
and independence between systems. The sample sizes should be equal in this approach. 
Another consideration is using common random numbers (CRN) to achieve significant 
variance reduction (Law, 2007:555). The same random number streams and seeds is used 
for each system to synchronize our use of random numbers. Since this approach 
intentionally creates dependence between the systems as a variance reduction technique, 
it requires paired-t test approach to construct confidence intervals for the difference 
between two performance measures. 
 Two different systems are used in this study. In the first one, all A/G aircraft use 
the same exact time to be over their targets. However, it provides different times for 
strikers to cross the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). In the other one, all strikers 
use same exact time to cross FEBA and this naturally provides different TOTs for A/G 
aircraft. The first system is named as System A, and the second one as System B.  
These systems are examined based on how these two different formations effect the 
vulnerability time of strikers in the range of SAM sites and the dispersion of HARM 
TOTs which are vital for strikers’ survivability and our response variable OS.  
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First, how different TOTs and attack methods of these systems affect vulnerability 
time was examined. The same design points for both systems were chosen and a paired-t 
test between the means was performed.  
In Table 7, the first line defines the design points. The letters stand for the system 
name, the numbers represent NTG, SOR, SLO, HFR factors in order. First the value of 
two for NTG was examined which means there are only two targets in the range. The 
other factors don’t have any effect on vulnerability times. As seen on the first two  
Table 7. Means of Vulnerability Times For Two Design Points of Each System  
A-2-50-10-1 B-2-50-10-1 A-6-50-10-1 B-6-50-10-1 
396.744 396.758 521.061 493.385 
382.531 382.546 503.108 476.828 
357.737 357.753 475.343 461.608 
369.602 369.615 500.428 477.512 
403.936 403.950 503.038 470.362 
356.818 356.832 482.712 459.474 
346.143 346.156 477.994 451.544 
359.698 359.714 484.514 459.407 
355.521 355.538 496.863 467.177 
355.167 355.181 476.597 456.672 
387.925 387.938 501.054 474.771 
347.650 347.665 489.361 464.104 
389.119 389.135 514.210 478.494 
366.425 366.439 482.421 460.833 
404.301 404.314 510.993 486.652 
369.537 369.550 474.874 448.083 
348.729 348.744 488.526 461.234 
371.098 371.113 483.558 459.106 
388.203 388.214 505.566 477.638 
345.134 345.149 470.040 453.691 
401.593 401.606 479.007 462.224 
371.727 371.742 490.940 477.207 
325.201 325.215 455.724 432.564 
399.275 399.291 505.694 474.657 
370.464 370.478 506.438 477.860 
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columns, the mean values are very close to each other. But the results of paired-t test 
(Table 8) which is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis  Ho: μA – μB = 0,  indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the  α = .05  level. The confidence interval does not 
contain zero and the p-value is smaller than α value. Although vulnerability times of 
systems are statistically different from each other, the difference at the second decimal 
place in the vulnerability times relating to the systems is clearly not practically significant 
when there are only two targets in the range.  
Table 8. Paired-t Test for Vulnerability Times (A-2-50-10-1, B-2-50-10-1) 
 N Mean StDev SE Mean 
A-2-50-10-1 25 370.81 21.49 4.30 
B-2-50-10-1 25 370.83 21.49 4.30 
Difference 25 -0.014270 0.001394 0.000279 
95% CI (-0.014845, -0.013695) 
P-Value 0.000 
 
 In the third and fourth column of Table 7, the mean values of vulnerability times 
for both systems at the value of six for NTG are shown along with results of the paired-t 
test (Table 9).  
Table 9. Paired-t Test for Vulnerability Times (A-6-50-10-1, B-6-50-10-1) 
 N Mean StDev SE Mean 
A-6-50-10-1 25 491.20   15.79 3.16 
B-6-50-10-1 25 466.52 13.32 2.66 
Difference 25 24.68 5.47 1.09 
95% CI (22.42, 26.94) 
P-Value 0.000 
 
The null hypothesis that these two vulnerability times are statistically same is 
rejected. But this time the confidence interval lies well above zero and is larger than the 
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first one. This result indicates that A/G aircraft in System A spend more time in the 
vulnerability area than A/G aircraft in System B. First it could be thought that all strikers 
in System A go into and out of SAM area at once and they have to spend less time in the 
target area. Since each A/G target location has a different distance to SAM site, and the 
vulnerability time window is calculated from the very first striker’s entering time to the 
threat zone until the very last striker’s exit time, it provides a dispersed and larger 
exposed time window for strikers.  
Since the numbers of SAM sites and A/G targets are not big values such as two 
for SAMs and three for A/G targets for each SAM, and the maximum range of SAM sites 
is limited to 25, the difference between two means cannot be thought practically 
significant. But if these values are increased, the difference between means will get 
higher and begin to make things more difficult for attackers. 
After finishing systems’ effect on vulnerability time, the difference between the 
systems influences our key MOE overall success is discussed. Sixteen design points for 
each system are chosen. These points include the low and high values of four factors. By 
applying paired-t tests to these points, the following results were observed. Means and 
standard deviations of each system, 95% confidence intervals and p-values are listed in 
Table 10.    
In the first two lines, the systems indicate that they are statistically different from 
each other since 95% CIs don’t cover zero and the p-values are smaller than α. For both 
design points System B shows better performance than System A. The only difference 
between the two design points is HFR. HFR does not have a significant effect on OS. The 
ineffectiveness of HFR is discussed later. 
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Table 10. Paired-t Test for OS 
Design Points System A  System B     
no NTG-SOR-SLO-HFR mean std dev mean std dev 95% CI p-value 
1 6-50-10-1 72.776 2.556 76.918 1.981 -5.001 , -3.281 0.000 
2 6-50-10-25 73.176 2.385 74.939 2.346 -2.725 , -0.802 0.000 
3 6-50-30-1 98.000 0.531 98.188 0.507 -0.468 ,  0.092 0.177 
4 6-50-30-25 97.898 0.544 97.748 0.581 -0.220 ,  0.521 0.409 
5 6-100-10-1 70.700 2.089 70.935 2.574 -1.546 ,  1.076 0.714 
6 6-100-10-25 66.521 3.122 69.554 2.791 -4.811 , -1.257 0.002 
7 6-100-30-1 86.531 1.004 87.764 1.142 -1.672 , -0.795 0.000 
8 6-100-30-25 84.225 1.173 86.178 1.186 -2.506 , -1.400 0.000 
9 2-50-10-1 56.320 5.613 62.080 4.522 -7.688 , -3.832 0.000 
10 2-50-10-25 57.218 5.111 60.963 4.784 -5.940 , -1.550 0.002 
11 2-50-30-1 96.802 1.068 96.213 1.308 -0.108 ,  1.285 0.094 
12 2-50-30-25 96.255 1.318 96.027 1.296 -0.557 ,  1.014 0.554 
13 2-100-10-1 45.637 3.354 51.313 5.499 -8.260 , -3.100 0.000 
14 2-100-10-25 42.547 2.653 49.113 4.720 -8.483 , -4.650 0.000 
15 2-100-30-1 72.063 2.562 71.990 3.878 -1.653 ,  1.800 0.930 
16 2-100-30-25 67.257 3.900 68.935 3.779 -3.218 , -0.139 0.034 
  
In the following two lines, a decrease in SLO from the first two lines is observed. 
A/G aircraft will be more successful when the skill levels of operators decrease. The rise 
in the mean values is an obvious proof of this development and these OS values are the 
highest ones among all these design points. At the same time, it cannot be said this 
change creates a difference between two systems as seen by. Failing to reject these 
systems are statistically different from each other for both design points at SLO value of 
30 sec. 
 In the fifth and sixth lines, the SOR and SLO level is increased to their high 
values. In line five, no difference between two systems is observed but in line six the 
effect of HFR on OS is seen. By decreasing OS value from 70.7 to 66.5, HFR provides a 
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statistical difference between System A and System B. In this case, HFR acted as a key 
factor with the high levels of SOR and SLO on changing OS value.   
 In lines seven and eight, no statistical difference between competing systems is 
observed. The major reason for this result is the high level of SOR accompanying with 
low level of SLO. As mentioned before, the high level of SOR make an interesting 
decrease in OS although SAM sites spend more time exposed to the threat of HARMs.  
 The remaining lines in Table 9 are a repeat of the same factor levels in the top of 
the table with a change in NTG value. The number of targets in the combat area is 
decreased from six to two. In lines nine and ten, no statistical difference between two 
systems is noted. However, comparing the mean response values with lines one and two, 
there is a great decrease in OS values. It indicates that, when the number of targets 
decreases in the area, SAM operators find more chances to engage their targets. Thus, 
they can detect and kill more aircraft which results in lower values of OS.  
 In lines 11 and 12, the highest scores of OS are seen again after six target versions 
of these design points. It proves the same idea above about the effect of the number of 
targets on OS. The same results for the rest of the designs are observed. Here again, the 
results fail to reject the claim that these systems are statistically the same. In lines 13 and 
14, better results with System B are shown and in lines 15 and 16, a significant effect of 
HFR on the results is observed. A high value for HFR shows System B is better in the 
last comparison. 
 The results and comments are discussed next. As opposed to our original 
expectations, System B showed better performance in most comparisons. Although the 
high values of SOR make an increase in exposed time to HARMs, the overall success 
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decreased. When the number of A/G targets and normally the number of A/G aircraft 
decrease in the range of SAM sites, SAMs killed more and gave a significant damage to 
Blue side. This shows the importance that EW assets should increase suppression with 
jamming to make SAM sites busy and inoperative. With few exceptions, HFR has no 
effect on the results. Since only eight HARMs are used in each sortie and the probability 
of failure rate cannot be too high, this result was no surprise. Finally the skill level of 
operators could be vital for both sides. When the value of SLO decreases, Blue side 
success increases. When SLO increases, Red inflicts greater damage to its opponent.  
 
4.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter, output analysis was discussed. First the appropriate length and 
number of replications of the model to produce necessary outputs was determined. The 
factors contributing to the model were then examined which resulted in a regression 
analysis with a factorial design. Finally the results of different competing systems were 
analyzed and conclusions about the factors in the model were drawn. Chapter 5 will 
discuss the highlights of this study.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 The previous four chapters presented the research that was undertaken. First a 
brief summary of SEAD mission evolution was introduced followed by a literature 
review on simulation, combat modeling and previous studies on related subjects. Next, 
important model details and information was provided. The last section analyzed the 
outputs of the model and provided conclusions. This chapter will give highlights from the 
previous chapters and make conclusions and recommendations for future research.  
 
5.2  Summary of the Research 
 The objective of this research was to build a responsive and flexible model using 
a discrete event simulation to investigate the effectiveness of a simplified SEAD scenario 
with its different factors. Thus simulation cannot by itself be a perfect representation of 
real world, the plan was to build a mission level model with enough details to draw 
conclusions. First the important factors that should be included in the model to represent 
a SEAD mission were designed. Several assumptions were made to keep the model 
feasible and simple. After determining the entities and main states of the entities, model 
construction began. 
 Movement, detection and searching were the major challenges for a combat 
model in an event-stepped simulation. After developing the main model, minor changes 
were made to the model to mirror real-world situations. These models involved the 
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characteristics of our design points which were used in regression analysis. The models 
were run for 10 days with 25 replications. Outputs from these different models were 
captured. The most important measure of effectiveness which is OS was evaluated. The 
study concluded with analysis and comments of the results. 
 
5.3  Conclusions of the Research 
 Four main factors were used in the model. These factors are SAM on-air rate 
(SOR), HARM failure rate (HFR), skill level of SAM operators (SLO) in terms of 
seconds to react to A/G aircraft and the number of A/G targets for each SAM site (NTG). 
The key MOE was determined as overall success (OS). Also two different systems were 
built to make comparisons. In System A, all A/G flights use only one TOT. In System B, 
A/G flights use different TOTs but same FEBA crossing time. 
 The results of the research show that when the exposure times of Red SAM sites 
against Blue HARMs increase, the higher levels of SOR always decrease Blue OS level. 
When NTG decreases, the success of Red SAM sites proportionally increases. It indicates 
that when the busy time of SAM operators and systems drops, they are more lethal 
against Blue forces. Naturally SLO provides results as expected and shows that skill level 
of operators significantly effects system performance. Finally HFR is the most ineffective 
factor in this research. Because of the low number of HARMs, HFR does not make major 
effects on the scores. 
Another result is System A causes Blue A/G aircraft to spend more time in the 
range of Red SAM sites which increases the vulnerability time of System A over System 
B. Because of that reason, System B shows a higher Blue OS in most of the runs. 
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 5.4  Recommendations for Future Study 
 The model can be enhanced by increasing the scope of this simulation. A 
simplified scenario of a SEAD mission was modeled. The number of SAM sites, targets, 
SEAD and A/G flight are limited. By increasing these numbers with minor logic changes 
in the model, more representative system performance could be captured. Model fidelity 
could be significantly increased by adding A/A, EW capabilities, intelligence and EOB 
update processes in support of these missions. 
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